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Summary and Introduction
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a 
wholly owned government corporation that insures the 
pension benefits of more than 44 million people. Estab-
lished by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974, PBGC insured more than $1.7 trillion 
worth of pension benefits by the end of 2004. That year, 
it paid $3 billion in benefits to more than 514,000 annu-
itants whose single-employer pension plans had been ter-
minated, and the agency is responsible for making pay-
ments to another 440,000 individuals when they retire. 
In addition, PBGC provided financial assistance to mul-
tiemployer plans that made payments to approximately 
100,000 beneficiaries.
Since the enactment of ERISA, the sponsors of tax-
deferred, defined-benefit pension plans have been re-
quired to have their plans insured by PBGC. Such plans 
provide retirement annuities based on a formula that usu-
ally depends on participants’ length of service and salary 
history. Sponsors are supposed to contribute enough to 
the plans to ensure that promised benefits, which are de-
ferred compensation, can be paid; the participants are 
usually not required to make contributions.
PBGC administers two distinct insurance programs: one 
for single-employer plans and one for multiemployer 
plans, in which the benefits usually are negotiated as part 
of a labor agreement. For the single-employer program, 
PBGC collects premiums from active plans. When plans 
have been terminated because they do not have enough 
assets to cover their pension liabilities, PBGC assumes all 
of their assets, pays participants’ retirement benefits 
within statutory limitations, and is responsible for bene-
fits to vested employees and former employees when they 
reach retirement age. When plans with adequate assets are 
terminated, PBGC oversees that process but does not pay 
the pension benefits. For the multiemployer program, 
PBGC collects premiums from covered plans and pro-
vides financial support (mostly in the form of loans) to fi-
nancially troubled plans.
Although PBGC has been providing pension insurance 
for nearly 30 years, the agency’s financial situation has 
been particularly volatile during the past decade and has 
deteriorated significantly during the past several years. At 
the end of 2000, the total value of assets held by PBGC 
exceeded the estimated present value of its liabilities by 
$10 billion. But by the end of 2004, the agency’s esti-
mated liabilities were $23.5 billion more than the value 
of its assets (see Figure 1). 
The sharp deterioration in PBGC’s financial health can 
be attributed mainly to the fact that, over the past several 
years, the agency has assumed responsibility for, or “trust-
eed,” numerous large pension plans that were signifi-
cantly underfunded—primarily from the airline and steel 
industries. From 2001 through 2004, PBGC’s single-
employer program took on more than $13 billion in 
claims, which constitutes over 71 percent of all claims as-
sumed by the agency. (Claims are the net cost of termi-
nating a pension plan—the gap between its assets and its 
liabilities.)
PBGC’s liabilities have been growing much faster than its 
income from premiums. In some cases, those liabilities 
have been the result of bankruptcies. In others, struggling 
companies have shifted their plans’ liabilities to PBGC in 
an effort to lower costs. In addition, the drop in the value 
of stocks after 2000 caused many well-funded pension 
plans to become seriously underfunded and more costly 
to PBGC at their termination. Finally, increases in life ex-
pectancy mean that PBGC is paying benefits to retirees 
for a longer period of time.
PBGC depends on premiums paid by the sponsors of 
defined-benefit plans to cover the shortfall between assets 
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Figure 1.
PBGC’s Net Financial Position, 1980 to 2004
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005).
and liabilities of terminated plans. But those premiums 
are set in statute and are not adjusted to compensate for 
either changes in plans’ participation or for PBGC’s 
claims experience. 
PBGC also is facing challenges arising from long-term, 
systemic changes to the pension system itself.1 Many em-
ployers have come to consider the defined-benefit plans 
that PBGC insures to be costly and cumbersome to 
maintain. Instead, employers are increasingly turning to 
defined-contribution plans as an alternative form of re-
tirement benefits for their workers. Under defined-
contribution plans, employers and/or employees make 
deposits to individual accounts, and the benefits depend 
on the total assets accrued at the time of retirement—
instead of promised amounts established up front by for-
mula.
Background
For more than 30 years, PBGC has provided pension in-
surance to thousands of privately sponsored defined-
benefit pension plans. Over the period, it has paid out 
more than $17 billion in benefit payments and is obli-
gated to pay billions more in the future.
The Enactment of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act
ERISA was signed into law in September 1974 by Presi-
dent Gerald Ford. Before then, the funding of retirement 
benefits and pension plans’ operations were largely left up 
to the discretion of individual employers. If an employer 
did not adequately fund its pension plan and then went 
out of business, the firm’s employees and retirees could be 
left with little, if any, pension benefits. The most notable 
instance occurred in 1963, when the Studebaker Com-
pany failed and more than 4,000 employees lost 85 per-
cent of their pension benefits.2 By enacting ERISA, the 
1. For a discussion of the financial risks and costs posed by PBGC, 
see Congressional Budget Office, The Risk Exposure of the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (September 2005).
2. See Steven E. Schanes, “ERISA Insights: Voices from the Early 
Days” (Brookfield, Wisc.: International Foundation of Employee 
Benefit Plans, 2001).
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Congress moved to protect workers’ financial interests in 
the retirement system.
Although ERISA covers several types of employee bene-
fits, it is primarily designed to protect participants in and 
beneficiaries of private-sector pension plans. Employers 
are not required to provide their employees with pension 
benefits, but if they do, ERISA requires the employers to 
purchase insurance from PBGC and establishes funding 
standards for the plans. In addition, the law specifies who 
must be covered by the plans and how long employees 
must work before qualifying for benefits. It operates in 
conjunction with sections of the tax code that also regu-
late contributions to employer-sponsored pension plans 
and their operations. To make tax-deferred contributions 
to a pension plan, employers must meet the requirements 
of both ERISA and the tax code. Pension plans that meet 
the requirements of both are often referred to as “quali-
fied.”
The Basics of Pension Insurance
By insuring retirement benefits, PBGC provides a mini-
mum level of pension benefits to participants in a quali-
fied defined-benefit pension plan in the event that the 
plan cannot pay benefits. PBGC shares regulatory and 
enforcement responsibilities over private-sector pension 
plans with the Internal Revenue Service in the Treasury 
Department (concerning participation, vesting, and 
funding standards) and the Department of Labor (con-
cerning fiduciary standards and reporting and disclosure 
requirements). If a plan’s sponsor does not meet its obli-
gations to pay premiums to PBGC or fails to meet the 
minimum funding standards contained in ERISA, PBGC 
has the power to place a lien on the sponsor’s assets. 
PBGC’s activities are limited to defined-benefit plans; the 
agency does not insure or regulate defined-contribution 
pension plans.
The most common defined-benefit plans are those spon-
sored by a single employer. A particular employer may 
sponsor several different plans, but each of those plans is 
considered a single-employer plan. In contrast, under a 
multiemployer plan, several employers who are involved 
in the same type of business collectively bargain with a 
union to provide a pension plan for employees who work 
for those firms. Multiemployer plans are most common 
among certain industries in which workers often move 
from firm to firm, such as the construction and transpor-
tation industries.
While the number of plans covered by PBGC has fallen 
substantially over the past 20 years, the number of partic-
ipants in those plans has grown modestly (see Figure 2). 
In 1980, PBGC covered more than 95,000 single-
employer plans and 2,244 multiemployer plans, whereas 
in 2004, those figures had dropped to fewer than 30,000 
and 1,600, respectively. Despite the decline in the num-
ber of plans, the number of participants in single-
employer plans grew from about 27.5 million to more 
than 34 million, and in multiemployer plans, from about 
8 million to 9.8 million.3
The sharpest decline in the number of defined-benefit 
plans has been among small firms. In 1980, plans cover-
ing fewer than 100 participants accounted for about 
76,000 of the more than 95,000 single-employer plans 
covered by PBGC. In 2003, those small plans made up 
18,000 of the 29,500 single-employer plans. Similar de-
clines also occurred in plans with between 100 and 1,000 
participants. In contrast, the number of large pension 
plans and the participation in them grew. Between 1980 
and 2003, the number of single-employer plans with 
5,000 or more participants grew from 714 to 1,133. At 
the same time, overall participation in those plans 
roughly doubled, from about 13 million to nearly 26 mil-
lion.
The fall in the number of plans is most easily explained 
by the general shift that is occurring between defined-
benefit and defined-contribution pension plans. A grow-
ing number of firms have replaced their traditional 
defined-benefit plans with defined-contribution plans, 
and most new firms choose to establish defined-
contribution plans.4 The reasons behind those decisions 
vary from firm to firm, but some cite the growing costs of 
financing future benefits, the administrative burdens of
3. Participants include current workers who are vested and former 
employees who will someday receive a deferred benefit, as well as 
all retirees, spouses, and survivors who are currently receiving ben-
efits.
4. See Leslie Papke, “Are 401(k) Plans Replacing Other Employer-
Provided Pension? Evidence from Panel Data,” Journal of Human 
Resources, vol. 34, no. 2 (1999), pp. 346-368. ERISA provides sev-
eral ways for employers to voluntarily terminate a defined-benefit 
plan and replace it with either a defined-contribution plan or no 
pension plan at all.
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Figure 2.
The Number of Pension Plans and Participants Insured by PBGC, 1980 to 2004
(Thousands) (Millions)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005).
complying with ERISA, and the increased mobility of the 
American workforce.
In recent years, many employers have attempted to deal 
with those issues by converting their traditional defined-
benefit plans into what are referred to as cash-balance 
plans. Under cash-balance plans, also called hybrid plans 
because they share certain characteristics with defined-
contribution plans, employers make regular contributions 
to hypothetical accounts on behalf of their employees. In-
dividual account statements track employers’ contribu-
tions and hypothetical interest earnings for each partici-
pant. In actuality, however, contributions to cash-balance 
plans are not deposited into individual accounts and re-
main the property of the sponsors. Technically, the plans 
are considered a type of defined-benefit plan (and are 
subject to ERISA in the same ways that other defined-
benefit plans are), but converting traditional defined-
benefit plans into cash-balance plans has raised legal chal-
lenges. The main issue is whether such conversions vio-
late age discrimination laws in how they treat the benefits 
of long-time employees. Given the disagreement over 
their legality, further conversions to cash-balance plans 
are effectively on hold.
The number of participants in single-employer plans cov-
ered by PBGC who were not actively employed by the 
sponsoring firms almost tripled from 1980 to 2001, 
growing from 6 million to almost 17 million. So while 
about 78 percent of PBGC’s covered participants were ac-
tive employees in 1981, just 51 percent were in 2001 (see 
Figure 3). That trend does not present problems to plans 
that are fully funded because benefits for current and fu-
ture retirees have been fully paid in advance. But it can 
present significant financial challenges to underfunded 
plans.
Funding Requirements for Pension Plans
Both ERISA and the tax code require that qualified plans 
meet minimum funding standards, which are designed 
primarily to protect the interests of both plans’ partici-
pants and PBGC. The standards are intended to ensure 
that each employer-sponsored plan has enough assets to 
pay promised benefits in the event that the sponsor vol-
untarily terminates it or the sponsor is unable to continue 
making deposits toward the plan. ERISA and the tax 
code also establish limits on the tax-deductible contribu-
tions that sponsors may make to their plans. Many of the
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Figure 3.
Work Status of Participants in Single-Employer Plans Covered by PBGC, 
1980 to 2002
(Percentage of total participation)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005). 
funding rules are intended to minimize volatility in the 
funding requirements for sponsors and to limit losses of 
federal revenues. The net result of current funding rules is 
that many plans have become badly underfunded over 
the past several years, thus exposing PBGC to substantial 
potential losses.
Minimum Funding Standards. The rules that govern 
plans’ funding begin with a concept known as a funding 
standard account (FSA). Each plan has an FSA, which is 
an accounting mechanism used to determine whether the 
pension plan is adequately funded. In general, if the value 
of a plan’s assets equals the present value of its current lia-
bilities, the plan has an FSA balance of zero.5 Each year, 
that balance is adjusted to reflect any increases or de-
creases in the plan’s assets and liabilities.
Charges to an FSA include normal accruals of benefits 
and investment losses on the plan’s assets, as well as 
amendments to the plan’s benefit structure and changes 
in actuarial assumptions that result in higher liabilities. 
Credits include normal contributions by the employer, 
investment gains on the plan’s assets, and changes to the 
plan’s benefit structure and actuarial assumptions that re-
duce liabilities. Most of the charges or credits are amor-
tized over a period of time, depending on the particular 
item. For instance, gains or losses on a plan’s assets are 
amortized over five years, and changes in a plan’s actuarial 
assumptions that result in an increase or decrease in lia-
bilities may be amortized over 10 years. Although amor-
tizing decreases volatility in the funding requirements, it 
can also lead to a mismatch between assets and liabilities 
in the short term. 
A sponsor of a plan that has a large balance in its FSA is 
generally not required to make additional contributions. 
However, the presence of such a balance does not pre-
clude underfunding because balances in an FSA do not 
reflect current market values. If a plan had a balance be-
cause of past overpayments but the assets representing 
those overpayments had since lost value, the loss in value 
would not affect the FSA’s balance. But under those cir-
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5. Current liabilities reflect benefit obligations that are based on cur-
rent pay and service to date.
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cumstances, the plan could be underfunded, and the 
sponsor would not be required to make additional contri-
butions.
ERISA also provides a method for obtaining a funding 
waiver in the event of business hardship. The Secretary of 
the Treasury may waive the normal funding requirements 
for a period of one year for a sponsor who can demon-
strate that it is experiencing a temporary hardship and 
that requiring normal contributions would be “adverse to 
the interests of plan participants.” A hardship waiver can-
not be granted for more than three out of 15 consecutive 
years, and the sponsor is required to make up any missed 
payments in later years. For multiemployer plans, 10 per-
cent of the participating sponsors must demonstrate busi-
ness hardship, and the waivers cannot be granted for 
more than five out of 15 consecutive years. 
Deficit Reduction Contributions. In single-employer 
plans with more than 100 participants, when the value of 
assets compared with current liabilities (known as the 
funding ratio) falls below 90 percent, sponsors are re-
quired to make additional payments. Amortization peri-
ods for such “deficit reduction contributions” (DRCs) 
vary depending on when the liabilities were incurred and 
the degree to which the plan is underfunded. A plan with 
unfunded liabilities that were incurred prior to 1988 has 
18 years to amortize those liabilities. A plan with un-
funded liabilities incurred after that date must contribute 
enough to reduce the underfunding by 30 percent annu-
ally. The 30 percent annual payment is reduced by 0.4 
percent for every percentage point that the plan’s funding 
ratio is above 60. Therefore, a plan that has an 80 percent 
funding ratio must reduce its unfunded liabilities at a rate 
of 22 percent annually. 
Although deficit reduction contributions are intended to 
ensure that badly underfunded plans return to adequate 
funding levels over a reasonable period of time, they often 
fall short of that goal. No plan that has a funding ratio of 
90 percent or higher must make a DRC. The rules fur-
ther exempt plans that have a funding ratio of between 80 
percent and 89 percent and have been above 89 percent 
for two consecutive years of the previous three years. In 
addition, balances built up in a plan’s FSA are applied to 
any required DRCs. Because such balances are not valued 
at current market prices, a plan that has built up large 
balances in past years but has become underfunded in 
subsequent years can remain underfunded without being 
required to make those payments. Finally, the Pension 
Funding Equity Act of 2004, or Public Law 108-218, 
also temporarily eased DRC requirements for sponsors of 
plans in the passenger airline and steel manufacturing in-
dustries for plan years 2004 and 2005.
Full-Funding Limit. The full-funding limit (FFL) speci-
fied in ERISA places a cap on the contributions that em-
ployers are required to make. Once at the limit, sponsors 
are not required to make any additional contributions, 
even if they might otherwise be required to do so. Specif-
ically, the FFL is the actuarial value of a plan’s accrued lia-
bilities minus the lesser of the market value of the plan’s 
assets or the actuarial value of its assets.6 The law gives 
sponsors some flexibility to determine the interest rate 
used to discount their accrued liabilities in calculating 
their FFL. Choosing a lower interest rate will act to in-
crease the value of a plan’s liabilities, thus raising its FFL, 
while choosing a higher interest rate will act to reduce the 
plan’s FFL.
The law also provides for an alternative calculation 
whereby the FFL cannot be less than 90 percent of cur-
rent liabilities minus the actuarial value of the plan’s as-
sets. The FFL is based on the larger of the two calculated 
amounts (see Box 1). Unlike the first method of calculat-
ing the FFL, the alternative method provides for dis-
counting current liabilities using interest rates that are 
spelled out in statute. With the exception of plan years 
2004 and 2005, when the specified interest rates are 
based on a composite rate for long-term corporate bonds, 
the rate used to discount current liabilities is based on the 
30-year Treasury rate. In general, the interest rates used to 
discount current liabilities are lower than those used to 
discount accrued liabilities, often resulting in a situation 
in which a plan’s current liabilities are higher than its ac-
crued liabilities. 
Maximum Deductible Contributions. In addition to re-
quirements designed to ensure a minimal level of fund-
ing, the law also places an upper limit on the annual tax-
deductible contributions that employers may make to
6. Accrued liabilities reflect total benefit obligations, including pro-
jected increases in benefits from anticipated salary increases and 
other factors. In accordance with ERISA, depending on the pur-
pose, PBGC uses different measures of a pension plan’s liabilities: 
current liabilities and accrued liabilities.
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Box 1.
How Plans’ Full-Funding Limit Is Calculated
The following examples show how the full-funding 
limit (FFL) is calculated for two different pension 
plans. These examples assume that the market value 
of assets is equal to the actuarial value of assets and at 
first assume that the plans do not have a balance in 
their funding standard account (FSA).
Using the plan’s assets and its accrued liabilities, Plan 
A’s full-funding limit would be zero because the two 
values equal each other. However, using an alterna-
tive calculation—known as the full-funding-limit 
override—which subtracts assets from 90 percent of 
current liabilities, the plan has a full-funding limit of 
$900 ($27,900 minus $27,000). Because the FFL is 
based on the larger of the two calculated amounts, 
the FFL for Plan A is $900. 
Using the plan’s assets and its accrued liabilities, Plan 
B’s full-funding limit is $1,000 ($28,000 minus 
$27,000). Subtracting the plan’s assets from 90 per-
cent of the plan’s current liabilities ($28,800 minus 
$27,000) yields a result of $1,800; thus, the full-
funding-limit override applies, and the FFL for Plan 
B is $1,800.
Balances in FSAs also play a role in determining 
FFLs. Plans use the total value of their assets includ-
ing the balance in their FSA to calculate the full-
funding-limit override but do not include that bal-
ance to calculate accrued liabilities.
Assume that Plans A and B both have an FSA bal-
ance of $900, bringing the total value of each plan’s 
assets to $27,900. 
Under the full-funding-limit override, Plan A’s origi-
nal FFL was $900 because 90 percent of its current 
liabilities minus its assets equaled $900. But includ-
ing the FSA balance of $900 boosts the value of its 
assets to the point that it equals 90 percent of current 
liabilities. Under the other method of calculating the 
FFL, the plan’s accrued liabilities still equal the value 
of its assets not including the FSA balance. Thus, 
both calculations yield an FFL of zero for Plan A.
In the original example, Plan B had an FFL of 
$1,800 based on the fact that 90 percent of its cur-
rent liabilities was $1,800 more than its assets, 
whereas its accrued liabilities were $1,000 more than 
its assets. Including the FSA balance of $900 in-
creases the value of the plan’s assets so that it is just 
$900 less than 90 percent of the plan’s current liabil-
ities. However, the plan’s assets excluding the FSA 
balance remain $1,000 less than its accrued liabili-
ties. Thus, Plan B’s FFL now stands at $1,000. 
Plan A:
Assets $27,000
Accrued Liabilities $27,000
Current Liabilities $31,000
90 Percent of Current Liabilities $27,900
Plan B:
Assets $27,000
Accrued Liabilities $28,000
Current Liabilities $32,000
90 Percent of Current Liabilities $28,800
Assets Without FSA Balance $27,000
FSA Balance $900
Total Assets $27,900
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their plans. Once at the limit, an employer may continue 
to make contributions but has to pay regular taxes on 
those contributions plus a 10 percent excise tax.
In general, sponsors are allowed to deduct all contribu-
tions needed to cover the normal costs of plans, plus re-
quired amortization payments on unfunded liabilities. 
Sponsors may also deduct all contributions that bring 
plans’ assets up to 100 percent of current liabilities, even 
if those contributions are greater than the required con-
tributions.
Interest Rates. The interest rates used to calculate the 
present value of a plan’s liabilities must be within a speci-
fied range above or below the weighted average of the in-
terest rates on 30-year Treasury bonds for the previous 
four-year period.7 That range is normally 90 percent to 
105 percent of the weighted average, but the Job Cre-
ation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-147) 
temporarily increased the upper bound of the range to 
120 percent for plan years 2002 and 2003. It is to spon-
sors’ advantage to use a higher interest rate when calculat-
ing funding levels because a higher rate lowers the present 
value of plans’ future liabilities.
The Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 went a step fur-
ther by temporarily changing the interest rates used to de-
termine the present value of liabilities. The law replaces 
the interest rates on 30-year Treasury bonds with a com-
posite rate on long-term investment-grade corporate 
bonds, as chosen by the Secretary of the Treasury. The 
rates on such corporate bonds are typically 50 to 100 ba-
sis points higher than those on 30-year Treasuries, so the 
substitution should reduce the present value of pension 
liabilities below what it would have been otherwise.8 
However, the change is in effect only for plan years 2004 
and 2005, after which the rates on 30-year Treasuries will 
again apply. 
The Operations of PBGC
In some respects, PBGC operates like a private insurance 
provider. In exchange for payments of premiums from 
plans’ sponsors, it underwrites certain retirement benefits 
if the plans fail. Sponsors must pay the agency a flat-rate 
premium, depending on how many participants the plans 
cover. Single-employer plans that are not considered fully 
funded pay an additional premium calculated according 
to the extent of their underfunding. In the event that a 
plan is no longer able to pay benefits and PBGC must as-
sume its liabilities, the plan forfeits all of its assets to the 
agency. In addition to collecting premiums and forfeited 
assets, PBGC also receives income from interest pay-
ments, dividends, and capital gains on the assets it holds 
(see Figure 4).
Although it resembles a private insurer in some ways, 
PBGC is different in key respects. Unlike a private insur-
ance provider, PBGC does not enter into contracts with 
individual plans but is required to cover all qualified de-
fined-benefit plans, just as sponsors of all such plans are 
required to have their plans insured by the agency. PBGC 
cannot refuse coverage for a plan that it believes is overly 
risky, nor does the law provide PBGC a way to adjust ei-
ther the benefits it provides or the premiums it charges.
Premiums
Under ERISA, both the flat-rate premium and the pre-
mium charged to underfunded single-employer plans are 
set by the Congress in statute. Both are payable to a re-
volving fund administered by PBGC.
The flat-rate premium is tied directly to the number of 
participants a plan has, including active workers, deferred 
annuitants, and current beneficiaries. The payment itself 
is calculated once a year by multiplying the premium rate 
by the number of participants in the plan, and it is due 
within three months of the start of each plan year. When 
ERISA was enacted, the flat-rate premium for single-
employer plans was $1 per participant, but it has been in-
creased legislatively to its current level of $19 per partici-
pant. The flat-rate premium for multiemployer plans 
started at $0.50 per participant and now stands at $2.60. 
In 2004, PBGC collected $677 million in flat-rate premi-
ums from single-employer plans and $25 million from 
multiemployer plans. 
In addition to the flat-rate premium, single-employer 
plans that are considered underfunded must also pay a 
variable-rate premium. In principle, the variable-rate pre-
mium is determined by the degree to which a plan’s 
vested liabilities exceed its assets on a net-present-value 
basis. In actuality, however, the formula does not require
7. The Department of the Treasury stopped issuing new 30-year 
bonds in 2002. In cases in which ERISA requires the use of rates 
on 30-year Treasuries to discount pension liabilities, current rates 
on outstanding 30-year Treasuries are used. The department has 
announced that it will again issue 30-year bonds in 2006.
8. A basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point.
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Figure 4.
PBGC’s Operations
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
many plans that are actuarially underfunded to pay the 
variable-rate premium. For plans that owe the variable-
rate premium, the payment is due to PBGC nine-and-a-
half months after the start of the plan year. 
In general, if a plan has reached the full-funding limit, it 
does not have to pay the variable-rate premium. Designed 
to limit the volatility of required funding and tax revenue 
losses, the FFL also has the effect of exempting many 
underfunded plans from paying a variable-rate premium. 
It has been estimated that the variable-rate premium was 
applied to only 20 percent of total underfunding in 2004, 
10 percent in 2003, and 5 percent in 2002.9
The variable-rate premium for single-employer plans is 
$9 per $1,000 of underfunding. Therefore, the sponsor 
of a plan with $5 million in underfunding would owe 
$45,000 for the variable-rate premium for the plan year. 
Sponsors of multiemployer plans are not required to pay 
the variable-rate premium.
Both ERISA and the tax code specify the same measures 
of assets and liabilities for determining whether sponsors 
of plans have met the appropriate funding requirements 
and can continue to make tax-deductible pension contri-
butions. ERISA uses somewhat different measures of lia-
bilities for determining how much, if anything, sponsors 
owe in variable-rate premiums. Although the provisions 
that govern funding requirements allow sponsors to use a 
range of interest rates to discount current liabilities, 
ERISA’s requirement for premiums specifies 85 percent 
of the 30-year bond rate for the month preceding the 
month in which the plan year begins.10
Of the $1.1 billion that PBGC collected in premiums 
from single-employer plans in 2004, about 40 percent 
was derived from the variable-rate premium. That 
amount was more than double the amount collected the 
year before. Detailed information about 2004 premiums 
is not yet available, but in 2003, more than 13,000 plans, 
representing almost half of all single-employer plans but 
just 17 percent of participants, were required to pay the 
variable-rate premium. Large plans (those with 5,000 or 
more participants) accounted for about half of total pay-
ments of the variable-rate premium; relatively small plans
9. See Douglas J. Elliot, “PBGC: Premium Hike Possibilities,” Cen-
ter on Federal Financial Institutions (April 10, 2005).
10. That formula was temporarily altered by P.L. 108-218, which 
replaces the rates on 30-year Treasury bonds with a composite 
corporate-bond rate for plan years 2004 and 2005 before return-
ing to the Treasury rate. In addition, the rate used to calculate pre-
miums will permanently increase to 100 percent of the 30-year 
bond rate once the Treasury Department issues new pension mor-
tality tables. However, those tables have been repeatedly delayed.
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Figure 5.
Portion of Variable-Rate Premium Paid 
in 2003 by Size of Plan
(Participants)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance 
Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005).
(those with fewer than 1,000 participants) accounted for 
about a quarter of all such payments, even though they 
represented less than a tenth of all participants (see 
Figure 5). 
Terminations of Pension Plans
Terminations of single-employer pension plans fall into 
one of three categories: standard, distress, and involun-
tary. 
An employer may voluntarily terminate its pension plan 
provided that it gives at least 60 days’ notice to partici-
pants, it ensures that the plan has enough assets to pay 
out all future benefits, and the termination does not vio-
late collective bargaining agreements with the firm’s em-
ployees. Ending a pension plan in that way is known as a 
standard termination. From 1975 through 2003, about 
164,000 fully funded plans underwent standard termina-
tions. PBGC does not become responsible for paying the 
benefits of such plans because their sponsors are required 
to purchase group annuity contracts from insurance com-
panies or make lump-sum payments to cover all accrued 
benefits, and no further benefits accrue after the termina-
tion takes place. 
In cases when a pension plan is underfunded and con-
tinuing to fund the plan would cause an employer to go 
out of business, the plan can be terminated by either the 
employer or PBGC. From 1975 through 2004, more 
than 3,400 underfunded plans were taken over by PBGC, 
either as distress or involuntary terminations. Over the 
past several years, nearly 95 percent of the plans trusteed 
by PBGC were the result of involuntary terminations.
A company may conduct a distress termination if PBGC 
determines one of the following conditions has been met:
B A petition has been filed seeking liquidation in bank-
ruptcy court; 
B A petition has been filed seeking reorganization in 
bankruptcy court, and the court has determined that 
the firm cannot be reorganized without terminating its 
pension plan;
B PBGC determines that the firm cannot continue to 
pay its creditors and remain in business unless the plan 
is terminated; or
B PBGC determines that continuing to contribute to 
the pension plan would place an unreasonable burden 
on the firm solely as the result of a decline in the num-
ber of employees covered by the plan.
In most cases, PBGC would prefer that terminations take 
place voluntarily, either through standard terminations or 
distress terminations. However, the law also gives PBGC 
the authority to conduct an involuntary termination of a 
pension plan under the following conditions:
B The plan has not met the minimum funding require-
ments;
B The plan cannot continue to pay benefits when due;
B A lump-sum payment has been made to a participant 
who is a substantial owner of the sponsoring com-
pany; or
B The eventual financial loss to PBGC is expected to in-
crease unreasonably if the plan is not terminated.
Under 1,000
 (25%)
1,000
 (14%)
2,500
 (9%)
5,000
 (13%)
10,000 +
 (40%)
Total Paid by All Plans: $294 Million
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Multiemployer plans generally are not terminated. If 
PBGC determines that a multiemployer plan is insolvent 
and can no longer pay its benefits, the agency provides fi-
nancial assistance directly to the plan, usually in the form 
of a loan, so that it can continue to make payments to 
beneficiaries. In 2004, PBGC provided 27 multiemployer 
plans with financial assistance totaling about $10 million.
PBGC’s Trust Funds
When an underfunded plan is terminated—either volun-
tarily or involuntarily—PBGC assumes control of the as-
sets held by that plan. The total value of those assets can 
vary tremendously depending on the plan’s number of 
participants and funding-to-benefits ratio. 
In 2004, PBGC assumed control of 96 single-employer 
plans with a total of $2.8 billion in assets. In addition to 
the pension-related assets, PBGC received $325 million 
in other assets turned over by sponsors of terminated 
plans. Those recoveries not related to pensions, which are 
often the result of bankruptcy agreements, help to offset 
the shortfall between assets and liabilities. But such recov-
eries are relatively small, totaling less than 5 percent of all 
of the liabilities taken on by PBGC, reflecting the fact 
that the agency has relatively low priority in bankruptcy 
proceedings. Those 96 plans also added more than $5.8 
billion in liabilities to the agency’s balance sheet. Thus, 
the trusteed plans had an average funding ratio of about 
49 percent when terminated. 
Over its entire history, PBGC has assumed more than 
$22 billion in assets from terminated plans against $42.6 
billion in total liabilities, providing an average funding 
ratio of about 52 percent.
Once a plan is terminated, assets are transferred to 
PBGC’s control and deposited into a nonbudgetary ac-
count held at a custodian bank. Those assets do not ap-
pear on the federal balance sheet, and the transfer of such 
assets is not considered a receipt to the government. As-
sets in the nonbudgetary trust fund are commingled and 
no longer identified as originating with particular plans. 
At the end of fiscal year 2004, the assets in PBGC’s non-
budgetary trust fund were valued at nearly $23 billion.
PBGC has broad authority to oversee and administer 
pension assets held in its trust fund. In a legal sense, those 
assets are treated as nonpublic in nature, and PBGC is 
free to invest and expend the funds as if it were a private 
fiduciary of the trust fund’s holdings. PBGC can invest 
the assets in whatever way it chooses, as long as it acts in 
the best financial interest of beneficiaries.
In addition to the nonbudgetary trust fund, PBGC has 
several on-budget revolving funds. Payments of premi-
ums and transfers from the trust fund for both benefit 
payments and administrative expenses are deposited to 
the revolving funds. Unlike the trust fund, the revolving 
funds appear on the federal government’s balance sheet 
and provide PBGC with permanent spending authority 
to carry out its activities. ERISA specifies the various pro-
grams and activities for which PBGC may use its revolv-
ing funds and the types of income that may be credited to 
each fund. Although technically there are seven revolving 
funds, PBGC uses only three, and their activities are 
combined into one fund for reporting purposes. Any as-
sets held in the revolving fund that are not used to pay 
benefits are considered unobligated balances and are 
available for expenditure in the next year. By law, all assets 
in the revolving fund must be held in Treasury securities 
and can earn interest income, which totaled $1.2 billion 
in 2004. As of the end of 2004, the unobligated balance 
of the revolving fund was $17 billion.11
PBGC transfers funds from the nonbudgetary trust fund 
(that is, the accumulated assets of terminated plans) to its 
on-budget accounts to pay a portion of retirement annu-
ities and certain administrative costs. Such transfers are 
referred to as reimbursements and are recorded as offset-
ting collections (that is, offsets to outlays) in the budget. 
Generally, the proportion of benefit payments that is re-
imbursed from the trust fund depends on the aggregate 
funding level among the plans that PBGC has taken over 
and is adjusted periodically. In other words, if the average 
funding ratio of all plans taken over by PBGC is 50 per-
cent, then half of all benefit payments originate from the 
nonbudgetary fund. Assets in the trust fund are liqui-
dated and transferred to the revolving fund by PBGC 
from time to time, depending in part on market condi-
tions. Transfers from the nonbudgetary trust fund can be 
irregular and often do not match when benefit payments 
are actually made. For example, the trust fund will even-
tually cover about half of the benefit payments made in 
2004, but the reimbursements actually made during the 
course of the year covered less than 30 percent of benefits. 
11. PBGC also has a $100 million line of credit with the Treasury 
Department, which it has drawn on only once—to cover the 
agency's startup costs—and quickly repaid.
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In addition to financing benefits, proceeds from liqui-
dated trust fund assets are also transferred to the revolving 
fund to pay for PBGC’s administrative expenses related 
to terminations. Those expenses can include the cost of 
valuing, collecting, and managing plans’ assets, paying le-
gal expenses related to plans’ terminations, and determin-
ing benefit payments for plans’ participants. PBGC’s 
other administrative expenses are currently paid directly 
from its revolving fund.12 
Benefits Paid by PBGC
In the event that a single-employer pension plan under-
goes either a distress or involuntary termination and 
PBGC becomes responsible for that plan, the accrual of 
all additional benefits, vesting, and the plan’s other regu-
lar obligations cease. PBGC pays benefits according to 
the provisions of each individual pension plan up to the 
limits of the guarantee specified in law. To ensure that on-
going benefit payments are not interrupted, PBGC pays 
active annuitants an estimated benefit while the agency 
examines the plan. Those estimated payments sometimes 
result in overpayments or underpayments, which the 
agency reconciles once it makes its final determination 
about benefit levels.
PBGC’s guarantees cover basic retirement benefits, most 
early-retirement benefits, disability benefits (when the 
disability occurred before the plan was terminated), and 
certain survivor benefits. In most cases, participants in a 
terminated plan receive all of the benefits that they were 
promised under the plan. However, ERISA places a cap 
on how much each participant in a terminated plan can 
receive, so some annuitants does not receive their full 
benefits. In other instances, PBGC is able to recover 
enough assets during a termination so that annuitants 
whose plan entitled them to benefits above the cap are 
able to collect more than the maximum guarantee.
For plans assumed by PBGC in 2005, the statutory limit 
on guaranteed benefits in the single-employer program is 
$45,614 ($3,801 monthly) for a single-life annuity be-
ginning at age 65. The maximum guarantee is adjusted 
downward for those who retire before the age of 65 and 
upward for those who retire later. For example, the maxi-
mum guarantee for a participant who retires at age 62 is 
$36,035 a year (or $3,003 a month) for a single-life an-
nuity—a reduction of roughly 20 percent. For a person 
who retires at age 70, the maximum guarantee is $75,719 
a year (or $6,310 a month). For a beneficiary who is al-
ready retired, the age used to determine the maximum 
amount guaranteed is the participant’s age as of the date 
of the plan’s termination. The maximum is adjusted each 
year for wage growth, but once PBGC determines an in-
dividual’s benefits, they remain constant. 
As specified in ERISA, PBGC places some additional 
limits on benefits. For instance, changes to a plan that in-
creased benefits and that were made within five years of 
the plan’s termination are not fully guaranteed. Generally, 
the larger of 20 percent or $20 per month of the in-
creased benefits is guaranteed for each full year that the 
increased benefits were in effect. In addition, benefits 
paid by PBGC are not adjusted for inflation, even if the 
original plan called for such increases. (Few defined-
benefit plans provide for automatic inflation adjust-
ments.) Although PBGC pays survivor benefits, they may 
be less generous than those promised by a plan.
Benefits themselves are normally paid on a monthly basis, 
unless the monthly benefit is $50 or less, in which case it 
is paid annually. If the net present value of pension bene-
fits is less than $5,000, the payee usually receives a lump-
sum payment, which can be rolled over into a defined-
contribution pension account.
All in all, restrictions on benefits normally affect more 
highly paid workers and early retirees the most. PBGC es-
timates that about 90 percent of payees in the single-
employer program receive all of the benefits that they 
were promised by their former plan.
In 2004, the average benefit payment in the single-
employer program was $475 per month for more than 
530,000 annuitants. In total, the single-employer pro-
gram paid out $2.9 billion in benefit payments in 2004, 
up from $2.4 billion the year before.
The Multiemployer Program
The smaller multiemployer program provides insurance 
coverage for 9.8 million participants in about 1,600 
plans. The construction and trucking industries represent 
about 60 percent of all insured plans and nearly 40 per-
cent of participants in the multiemployer program. The 
12. Prior to 2004, administrative expenses not directly related to ter-
minations were paid from appropriations, which were then reim-
bursed by the revolving fund. Legislation enacted in 2003 
eliminated the distinction between moneys covering administra-
tive expenses related to terminations and those unrelated to termi-
nations; now, all administrative spending is considered direct 
spending from the revolving fund.
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vast majority of participants are in plans with more than 
10,000 people, although data on multiemployer plans are 
limited. 
As required by ERISA, PBGC’s multiemployer program 
is legally distinct from the single-employer program. 
Cross-subsidization between the two programs, including 
mixing assets and premiums, is not permitted. Originally 
under ERISA, the single-employer and multiemployer 
plans received similar treatment by PBGC. However, the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 
(P.L. 96-364) recognized that the two types of pension 
plans are fundamentally different. 
The funding rules that govern single-employer plans gen-
erally apply to multiemployer plans as well, but multiem-
ployer plans are allowed to amortize increases in liabilities 
over longer periods of time than single-employer plans. 
Contribution levels for multiemployer plans are usually 
set through collective bargaining, which means sponsors 
of such plans usually have less flexibility to change contri-
butions than sponsors of single-employer plans do. 
ERISA establishes a special set of rules for firms that wish 
to discontinue their cosponsorship of a multiemployer 
plan. Employers must pay a “withdrawal liability,” which 
represents the sponsors’ pro rata share of the plan’s un-
funded liabilities.
Because multiemployer plans are sponsored by several 
distinct companies, they are more diversified than single-
employer plans and have historically been less likely to 
encounter financial difficulty. For the 10 multiemployer 
plans that failed prior to 1980, PBGC pays benefits di-
rectly to beneficiaries, much as it does in the single-
employer program. In 2004, the agency paid benefits to a 
total of 320 beneficiaries from multiemployer plans, 
down from 1,300 beneficiaries in 1995.
Plans that develop financial difficulty are required to pay 
full benefits until they run out of assets. When a multi-
employer plan becomes insolvent, benefit payments can 
be reduced or suspended in accordance with PBGC’s 
benefit guarantees.13 PBGC then provides financial assis-
tance to the plan, usually in the form of loans, which the 
plan uses to continue to pay benefits. Those loans con-
tinue until the plan recovers or until all vested benefits 
have been paid. If the plan recovers from insolvency, it is 
required to repay all outstanding loans, including inter-
est, to PBGC according to “reasonable terms” set by the 
agency. In most cases, however, the plan never recovers, 
and PBGC writes off the loans. In 2004, PBGC provided 
$10 million worth of financial assistance to 27 multi-
employer plans. 
As mentioned, the multiemployer program is financed 
through a premium that is currently $2.60 per partici-
pant. Multiemployer plans paid a total of $25 million in 
premiums in 2004. Unlike the single-employer program, 
the multiemployer program does not require a separate 
premium based on the adequacy of a plan’s funding. Al-
though smaller, the multiemployer program is experienc-
ing some of the same problems facing the single-
employer program. The net position of the multi-
employer program has declined rapidly over the past sev-
eral years, from a surplus of $341 million in 1998 to a 
deficit of $236 million in 2004 (see Figure 6).
Figure 6.
The Multiemployer Program’s Assets 
and Liabilities, 1990 to 2004
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance 
Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005).
13. The current monthly guaranteed benefit for participants in multi-
employer plans is up to $11 per month multiplied by the total 
years of service under the plan, plus 75 percent of the next $33 per 
month multiplied by the total years of service. That guarantee 
level is not indexed to inflation.
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PBGC’s Financial Condition and
Outlook
PBGC’s finances can be assessed in two ways. One ap-
proach is accrual accounting, which measures the total 
value of all assets held by PBGC and the total value of all 
liabilities the agency will be responsible for paying. The 
other approach is cash accounting, which tracks how 
much money the agency takes in each year versus the 
amount of money it spends. Accrual accounting is the 
norm within the pension industry and is a useful tool for 
projecting the adequacy of the agency’s funding to cover 
benefits that will be paid decades in the future. However, 
the federal budget generally does not use accrual account-
ing and mainly operates on a cash basis. The budget also 
does not record the receipt of pension assets assumed by 
the nonbudgetary trust fund when pension plans termi-
nate. The budget recognizes the receipt of those funds 
only when they are liquidated and transferred to the on-
budget revolving fund to help pay for benefits and ad-
ministrative expenses.
PBGC’s Net Position
PBGC’s overall fiscal health is usually measured by look-
ing at its net financial position, which is defined as the 
difference between the program’s assets and the present 
value of its liabilities. Assets include the current fair mar-
ket value of all cash, bonds, equities, and other holdings 
of PBGC’s trust fund and revolving fund. Liabilities are 
calculated as the estimated present value of all future ben-
efits that PBGC is obligated to pay on behalf of termi-
nated plans, those pending termination, and plans that 
PBGC identifies as likely to terminate. Calculating liabil-
ities in present-value terms is a common practice in the 
pension industry and provides the most accurate long-
range picture of PBGC’s fiscal health.
From the time it began operations in 1975 through 1995, 
PBGC’s net financial position was negative; that is, the 
total value of the assets on hand was not enough to cover 
projected future benefit payments. Over the 1975-1995 
period, the agency’s net financial position reached a low 
of -$2.6 billion in 1993. Starting in 1996, however, the 
situation changed and PBGC’s net financial position be-
came positive, reaching a peak of $10 billion in 2000. 
The pendulum swung back in 2002, and a record short-
fall of $23.5 billion existed by the end of 2004 (see 
Table 1). 
Fluctuations in the agency’s net position arise mostly 
from changes in the financial condition of PBGC’s 
single-employer program. Until recently, assets and liabil-
ities within the single-employer program have tended to 
move together (see Figures 7 and 8). Both liabilities and 
assets jumped in the early 1990s as PBGC took over sev-
eral large pension plans in the airline industry. For most 
of next decade, liabilities flattened as the agency took over 
relatively small plans. At the same time, the value of 
PBGC’s assets, much of which was invested in the equi-
ties market, surged. The net position of the single-
employer program reached a surplus of $9.7 billion in 
2000.
Starting in 2001, however, liabilities began to swell rap-
idly as the agency took over several large pension plans in 
the airline and steel industries. From 2001 through 2003, 
PBGC took responsibility for roughly $25 billion in lia-
bilities against $14 billion in assets and recoveries, result-
ing in claims against the agency of nearly $11 billion. At 
the same time, the stock market began to slump, eroding 
the value of PBGC’s investment assets, while declining 
interest rates boosted the present value of its liabilities. 
The result was a $33 billion drop in the net position of 
the single-employer program from 2000 to 2004. 
In a separate analysis released earlier this month, CBO es-
timated that the present value of PBGC’s net costs for 
single-employer plans totals about $87 billion for the 
next 10 years—consisting of $23 billion from claims for 
plans that have already terminated or whose termination 
is imminent, and more than $63 billion of prospective 
losses (net of future premiums) for terminations that have 
not yet occurred.14 CBO’s estimate of $87 billion reflects 
the market value of PBGC’s insurance, that is, the price 
that a private insurer would charge to accept the premi-
ums and PBGC’s insurance obligations for currently ter-
minated plans and those that terminate during the 10-
year period. It incorporates a charge for the cost of mar-
ket risk, a cost that arises because investors demand com-
pensation for the fact that new claims are likely to be 
higher in bad economic times, when more sponsoring 
firms fail, and the value of pension assets is depressed. 
The figure also includes all estimated losses on insured 
plans even though current law limits the government’s 
14. See Congressional Budget Office, The Risk Exposure of the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (September 2005).
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Table 1.
PBGC’s Net Financial Position, 2000 to 2004
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005).
liability to those that can financed by the income and as-
sets available to PBGC.
In 2004, PBGC adopted a new investment policy de-
signed to reduce its financial risk by better matching the 
duration of its assets and liabilities. The agency intends to 
increase the percentage of its portfolio invested in fixed-
income securities and decrease its holdings in equities. 
Such a strategy means that any change in the value of the 
agency’s liabilities should be closely matched by a change 
in the value of its portfolio. At the end of fiscal year 2004, 
about 30 percent of the agency’s total assets were in equi-
ties. According to PBGC’s new investment policy, it will 
eventually invest between 15 percent and 25 percent of 
its total assets in equities. During 2004, PBGC reported a 
$3.2 billion investment gain, $1 billion of which was 
from fixed-income securities and $2.2 billion from equi-
ties.
PBGC’s Cash Flows
Prior to 1981, PBGC’s cash flows appeared in the appen-
dix to the federal budget but were not included in federal 
budget totals. Changes to ERISA enacted in 1980 man-
dated that PBGC’s cash flows be included in the federal 
budget.
From its first full year of operation until 2003, PBGC 
took in more cash each year than it spent. According to 
the government’s cash accounting rules, PBGC ran a cu-
mulative on-budget surplus of more than $12 billion 
from 1981 through 2002. An observer looking at PBGC
only on a cash basis might have concluded that it was on 
a firm financial footing. In running cash surpluses for so 
long, the agency managed to accrue substantial assets, 
both in the on-budget revolving fund and in the nonbud-
getary fund.
Figure 7.
The Single-Employer Program’s Assets 
and Liabilities, 1980 to 2004
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance 
Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005). 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Single-Employer Program 
Total assets 20.8 21.8 25.4 34.0 39.0
Total liabilities 11.1 14.0 29.1 45.3 62.3
 Net position 9.7 7.7 -3.6 -11.2 -23.3
Multiemployer Program
 Total assets 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
Present value of future benefits and 
nonrecoverable financial assistance 0.4 0.7 0.8  1.3  1.3
 Net position 0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.2
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Figure 8.
Annual Change in the Single-Employer 
Program’s Assets and Liabilities, 
1981 to 2004
(Percentage change)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance 
Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005).
In 2003, PBGC experienced its first cash deficit, spend-
ing $229 million more than it realized in receipts (see 
Figure 9 and Table 2). The deficit was, in part, a reflec-
tion of the fact that benefit outlays had risen by more 
than 250 percent over the previous three years, from $1.1 
billion in 2001 to $2.9 billion in 2004. Over the same 
time period, on-budget receipts from the agency’s various 
sources of income did not keep pace, increasing from 
$2.4 billion in 2001 to $3.4 billion in 2004. The 2003 
deficit was also partly the result of an irregular pattern in 
the program’s receipts—especially for trust fund reim-
bursements. In 2004, the agency once again realized a 
cash surplus of $247 million.
CBO’s Baseline Projections
According to CBO’s projections, PBGC will run cash 
deficits for the foreseeable future, draining its on-budget 
revolving fund. By CBO’s calculations, that fund will run 
out of assets within the next 10 years. 
In its baseline, CBO projects PBGC’s anticipated collec-
tions and spending 10 years into the future. Those base-
line projections represent CBO’s best estimate as to how 
much money the agency will collect and spend each year 
over the next 10 years, under an assumption that no 
changes are made to the laws that govern its programs.
Although PBGC does not spend any federally appropri-
ated funds, its net cash flow affects the federal budget. 
Because premiums, interest earnings, and other receipts 
are considered offsetting collections, a reduction in those 
receipts results in an increase in mandatory spending. If 
PBGC’s offsetting collections are smaller than what it 
spends in a given year, the effect is to increase the budget 
deficit.
According to CBO’s August 2005 baseline projections, 
PBGC’s spending on retirement benefits and financial as-
sistance to multiemployer plans is estimated to grow from 
about $4 billion in 2005 to more than $10 billion in 
Figure 9.
PBGC’s Outlays and Receipts, 
1976 to 2004
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Budget of the United States Government, Appendix (vari-
ous years).
Notes: Net outlays represent the surplus (-) or deficit (+) experi-
enced by the program on a cash basis.
Spikes in the program's gross outlays are mostly the result of 
short-term expenses related to terminations or court-
ordered benefit payments. Spikes in receipts are mostly the 
result of changes in premium rates or plans' underfunding 
(which affects collections of the variable-rate premium) and 
the timing of reimbursements from PBGC's nonbudgetary 
trust fund.
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Table 2.
PBGC’s On-Budget Outlays and Offsetting Collections, 2001 to 2004
(Millions of dollars)
Sources: Budget of the United States Government, Appendix (various years); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Note: A negative net outlay reduces the budget deficit; a positive net outlay increases the deficit.
a. Other offsetting collections consist mainly of payments from the nonbudgetary account to the on-budget account for services rendered.
2015, or an average of about 10 percent per year (see 
Table 3). PBGC’s administrative expenses, including 
spending related to terminations, and certain categories 
of offsetting collections, including sponsors’ payments of 
flat-rate and variable-rate premiums, are projected to re-
main fairly constant over the period. The interest credited 
on Treasury bonds held by the on-budget revolving fund 
will decline as balances in the fund fall; and reimburse-
ment payments received from the nonbudgetary fund 
will have to increase steadily to cover the rising benefit 
payments.
CBO anticipates that PBGC will record a small surplus 
for 2005. Starting in 2006, CBO projects, the agency will 
begin spending more than it collects, with cash deficits 
growing steadily for the next several years—attributable 
mainly to increases in benefit outlays for the single-em-
ployer program. By 2015, benefit payments for the sin-
gle-employer program will be roughly three-and-a-half 
times larger than what they were in 2004, according to 
CBO’s estimates. Over the same period, PBGC’s pre-
mium income—the main form of income covering the 
program’s unreimbursed costs—will remain basically flat.
In CBO’s estimation, PBGC’s on-budget revolving fund 
will be completely exhausted around 2013.While there is 
no precedent for how PBGC will proceed if the revolving 
fund becomes insolvent, CBO assumes that the agency 
will cover its expenses by increasing the percentage of 
benefits and other expenses being paid by the nonbudget-
ary trust fund, which will still be solvent through at least 
2015, according to CBO’s estimates. Therefore, starting 
in 2013, reimbursements from the trust fund will have to 
increase sharply in order to cover benefit payments and 
administrative expenses.
Projections of on-budget cash flows do not include the 
assets held in or income earned by the agency’s nonbud-
getary trust fund, except to the extent that they are trans-
ferred to the on-budget account. When a plan fails and is 
assumed by PBGC, the total value of the nonbudgetary 
trust fund tends to increase much more than the initial 
increase in PBGC’s outlays for benefits because the trans-
fer of the plan’s assets takes place almost immediately and 
benefits are paid out over a long period of time. Conse-
quently, the size of the nonbudgetary trust fund can be a 
misleading indicator of PBGC’s financial health. 
Under current law, no substantial source of funds is avail-
able to PBGC if it runs out of money. Premium rates are 
set by law and cannot be changed by the agency itself. 
Other than a $100 million line of credit with the Trea-
sury Department, no source of additional funding for the 
agency exists. In the event that PBGC were to exhaust all
2001 2002 2003 2004
Outlays
 Benefit payments and financial assistance 1,101 1,883 2,277 2,883
 Administrative expenses 155 210 252 278
Gross outlays 1,256 2,093 2,529 3,161
Offsetting Collections
Premiums -850 -864 -866 -1,139
Payments received from nonbudgetary account -946 -1,513 -624 -1,063
Interest credited to on-budget account -598 -676 -810 -1,206
Othera -4 -5 0  0
Total collections -2,398 -3,058 -2,300 -3,408
Net Outlays -1,068 -965 229 -247
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Table 3.
CBO’s Baseline Projections for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
2005 to 2015
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: A negative net outlay reduces the budget deficit; a positive net outlay increases the deficit.
a. According to CBO’s projections, PBGC’s on-budget revolving fund will be exhausted after 2013. See the discussion on page 17.
of its holdings, either benefit payments would be drasti-
cally cut or the Congress would have to enact a bailout. 
The Center on Federal Financial Institutions estimates 
that if PBGC’s assets are eventually exhausted, its ongo-
ing income would fund only about 10 percent of its an-
nual benefit obligations.15
Uncertainties About PBGC’s Future
PBGC is an agency that, by its very nature, faces many 
uncertainties. As an insurer, it bears many of the risks in-
curred by private pension plans. Those risks are influ-
enced by many factors outside of the agency’s control, 
such as investment decisions by plans’ sponsors, the va-
garies of the private equities market, the general state of 
the economy, and the financial condition of sponsors. Al-
though large in terms of the agency’s history, the $33 bil-
lion swing in PBGC’s net position over the past four years 
is not necessarily an isolated incident, but an example of 
how an economic downturn, low interest rates, and the 
termination of several large plans can produce dramatic 
changes in the agency’s financial picture.
During the late 1990s, the run-up in the stock market 
caused the value of assets held in defined-benefit pension 
plans to swell, so many previously underfunded plans be-
came fully funded according to the measures specified by 
ERISA. In 1996, almost half of all single-employer plans 
were sufficiently underfunded that they had to pay the 
variable-rate premium; by 2000, just 28 percent of plans 
had to. However, as economic conditions deteriorated, 
the financial position of many pension plans suddenly 
changed for the worse. In 2003, about 55 percent of 
plans were required to pay the variable-rate premium.
Since 2000, the extent of underfunding among PBGC-
insured plans has measurably increased. Partly a function 
of the drop in the stock market, it is also a result of low 
interest rates. The extended period of low interest rates 
has pushed the present value of pension liabilities up-
ward, causing more plans to become underfunded. Con-
sequently, sponsors faced a twofold financial pressure: 
having to put more money into their plans to reduce 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Outlays
Benefit payments and financial 
assistance 3,923 5,192 5,690 6,299 6,962 7,522 8,098 8,726 9,254 9,690 10,170
Administrative expenses 353 441 455 472 487 489 486 480 463 436 407
Gross outlays 4,276 5,633 6,145 6,771 7,449 8,011 8,584 9,206 9,717 10,126 10,577
Offsetting Collections
Premiums -1,559 -1,284 -1,259 -1,518 -1,486 -1,430 -1,383 -1,392 -1,403 -1,414 -1,428
 Payments received from 
nonbudgetary account -2,070 -2,882 -3,174 -3,530 -3,921 -4,258 -4,607 -4,989 -6,387 -8,687 -9,123
 Interest credited to 
on-budget account   -758   -714   -655   -598   -514   -409   -282   -135  -29  -25  -26
Total collections -4,387 -4,880 -5,088 -5,646 -5,921 -6,097 -6,272 -6,516 -7,819 -10,126 -10,557
Net Outlays -111 753 1,057 1,125 1,528 1,914 2,312 2,690 1,898 0a 0a
15. See Douglas J. Elliot, “PBGC: When Will the Cash Run Out?” 
Center on Federal Financial Institutions (September 13, 2004).
A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION 19
Figure 10.
Income from Premiums Compared with Total Benefit Payments in the Single-
Employer Program, 1985 to 2004
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book, 2004, no. 9 (Spring 2005). 
underfunding and making variable-rate premium pay-
ments to PBGC because of their underfunding. The need 
to divert more money to funding their pension plans, 
combined with other systemic business problems, helped 
push some companies into bankruptcy.
The prevalence of underfunding may reflect a belief held 
by some sponsors that the performance of their plan’s in-
vestments can eventually overcome a shortfall in contri-
butions. They may also feel that, even though contribu-
tions are tax-deductible, other activities are more valuable 
to their company’s financial success.
Fluctuations in plans’ funding levels have several effects 
on PBGC’s cash flows. Because the agency's variable-rate 
premium is charged to underfunded plans, as underfund-
ing increases, so too does income from premiums. But 
while greater underfunding may cause premium income 
to increase, it also tends to increase the size of claims to be 
paid by PBGC if and when underfunded plans terminate 
(see Figure 10).
The performance of the stock market, long-term interest 
rates, the pace at which sponsors fund their pension obli-
gations, and bankruptcy rates among plans’ sponsors will 
all play important roles in determining the future finan-
cial performance of PBGC. But it appears unlikely that 
the agency will be able to pay all insured benefits for ter-
minated plans in the coming years without substantial 
additional financial resources.
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Glossary
Accrual accounting: A way of tracking transac-
tions at the time a liability is incurred or a receivable is 
promised rather than when cash is paid or received.
Annuitant/beneficiary: Someone who is actively receiv-
ing regular payments from a pension plan, including re-
tired workers, as well as surviving spouses and children.
Asset value: Total value on the open market of all bonds, 
equities, and other investments held by a plan; also 
termed the mark-to-market value. The Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act and the tax code allow plans to 
“smooth” asset valuations to avoid fluctuations due to in-
vestment gains and losses.
Benefit accrual: The normal increase in benefits 
that results from an increase in covered service or salary. 
Cash-balance plan: A type of defined-benefit pen-
sion plan in which the employer makes regular contribu-
tions (usually based on salary) to hypothetical individual 
accounts on behalf of its employees. The balance in each 
account grows according to interest credits determined by 
the sponsor. Benefits are based on the total balance in 
each account upon retirement. Although cash-balance 
plans resemble defined-contribution plans in many re-
spects, from a legal point of view they are considered
defined-benefit plans. 
Cash flow: A cash receipt or outlay for a particular period 
of time.
Claim: A present-value measure of the cost to the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation for a terminated plan. 
It is the net difference between a plan’s assets and termi-
nation liabilities.
Covered plan: A defined-benefit pension plan meeting 
certain criteria contained in the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act and the tax code that allow contribu-
tions to the plan to be tax-deferred. Such plans are re-
quired to have their benefits insured by the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Deferred annuitant: Someone who is entitled to 
receive retirement benefits from a pension plan but is no 
longer employed by the plan’s sponsor and has not yet 
reached the plan’s required age for collecting benefits.
Deficit reduction contributions (DRCs): Payments by 
sponsors of certain pension plans that are determined to 
be underfunded under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act and the tax code. The sponsors must make 
DRCs in addition to normal pension contributions for 
the regular accrual of benefits.
Defined-benefit plan: A type of pension plan under 
which benefits are based on a formula that usually de-
pends on participants’ length of service and salary history. 
Plans’ sponsors are required to contribute enough to en-
sure that promised benefits can be paid. Employees are 
usually not required to make contributions to defined-
benefit plans.
Defined-contribution plan: A type of pension plan un-
der which deposits are made to individual accounts by 
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employers and/or employees and benefits depend on the 
total assets accrued in each account.
Discount rate: Interest rate used to determine the 
present value of future pension payments. 
Distress termination: A termination of an underfunded 
pension plan initiated by a sponsor in severe economic 
distress or bankruptcy. In order to qualify for a distress 
termination and have the plan assumed by the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the sponsor must meet 
rules prescribed by the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act.
ERISA: The Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974. Along with the tax code, ERISA is the 
law that governs employee benefits, including pensions. It 
established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
and required sponsors of qualified defined-benefit plans 
to insure their pension benefits with the agency.
Flat-rate premium: An annual per-participant pre-
mium charged to both single-employer and multiem-
ployer plans covered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC). Single-employer plans are charged 
$19 per participant; multiemployer plans are charged 
$2.50 per participant. Those rates are set in law and can-
not be altered by PBGC.
Full-funding limit: The maximum amount a sponsor is 
required to contribute to its pension plan in a given plan 
year.  Plans that have reached the full-funding limit are 
exempt from paying the variable-rate premium.
Funding ratio: The proportion of assets to liabilities held 
by a pension plan. For example, a plan that has assets of 
$20 million and liabilities of $16 billion has a funding ra-
tio of 125 percent.
Funding standard account: An accounting device used 
to determine the amount of contributions that is due 
from a plan’s sponsor for the normal accrual of benefits as 
well as changes to the plan’s benefit structure.
Group annuity purchase: The sale of pension li-
abilities to a private insurance provider. Benefits no 
longer accrue to the plan and the insurance provider be-
comes responsible for paying all remaining pension bene-
fits.
Hybrid pension plan: A defined-benefit pension 
plan that has characteristics similar to those of a defined-
contribution plan. Cash-balance plans are a type of hy-
brid pension plan.
Involuntary termination: The procedure by which 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) ini-
tiates the termination of a pension plan. For PBGC to 
conduct an involuntary termination, the plan must meet 
certain criteria specified by the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act. In general, involuntary termination 
must occur when a plan is unable to pay benefits and may 
occur in cases in which PBGC determines that allowing a 
plan to continue will lead to unreasonable increases in 
unfunded liabilities.
Liability: A present-value measure of pension ben-
efits. There are various ways to measure pension liability.
B Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
accrued liability is the present-value measure of bene-
fits based on current service and projected pay used to 
determine a plan’s funding; it incorporates long-term 
assumptions to reflect expectations about future bene-
fits.
B Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
current liability is the present-value measure of benefits 
based on current pay and service used to determine a 
plan’s funding; it incorporates assumptions to reflect 
the value of benefits today. 
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B Termination liability is the present-value measure of 
benefits at a particular date after which no more liabil-
ities accrue and no additional contributions are made 
to a plan. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion’s termination liability is adjusted to account for 
any legal limitations that may apply to benefits pro-
vided by the plan.
Maximum deductible contribution: The maxi-
mum amount a sponsor can contribute to its pension 
plan without paying taxes on its contributions.  Contri-
butions above the maximum are subject to regular corpo-
rate taxes plus a 10 percent excise tax.
Multiemployer pension plan: A kind of defined-benefit 
pension plan that is sponsored by multiple firms usually 
in a common industry in which employees frequently 
switch employers (such as construction and trucking). 
Contributions to the plan are collectively bargained by 
the employing firms and union representatives; benefits 
are set by a board of trustees, which also administers the 
plan.
Net position: The difference between the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s total assets and liabilities, 
calculated on a present-value basis. Liabilities include the 
claims of plans it considers probable to terminate.
Nonbudgetary trust fund: A fund in which assets, out-
lays, and receipts are not included in the federal budget. 
In the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s case, as-
sets and recoveries from terminated plans are placed in a 
nonbudgetary trust fund, where they are managed until 
they are liquidated and transferred to the agency’s revolv-
ing fund.
On-budget: The status of outlays and receipts that 
are recorded by the federal budget.
Participant: An individual who is vested in a covered 
pension plan. Participants can be currently employed, 
vested but separated, or former employees who are col-
lecting annuities.
Plan year: A 12-month period of time during which a 
pension plan is required to make certain calculations and 
perform certain tasks. The plan year does not necessarily 
correspond with the calendar year or fiscal year. For ex-
ample, a particular plan might record its plan year 2005 
as running from July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006.
Present value: A method of measuring liabilities that in-
volves discounting payments that will be made in the fu-
ture back to current dollars.
Probable termination: A termination that the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation believes is likely in the 
foreseeable future. The agency uses these criteria to help 
identify such a plan: the plan’s sponsor is in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy; the sponsor has granted security to an unse-
cured creditor as part of renegotiation of debt; the spon-
sor is known to be in default on existing debt; the spon-
sor’s unsecured debt is rated CCC+/Caa1 by Standard & 
Poor’s or Moody’s, respectively. The Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation may also consider other factors to 
determine how likely a plan is to terminate.
Qualified plan: See “covered plan.”
Reasonably possible termination: A termination 
by a plan that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
believes is at high risk in the foreseeable future but that is 
not classified as probable. The agency uses these criteria 
to help identify such a plan: the plan’s sponsor is in Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy; the sponsor has missed the minimum 
funding contribution; the sponsor’s bond rating is below 
investment grade; the sponsor has no bond rating but the 
ratio of long-term debt plus unfunded benefit liabilities 
to the market value of shares is 1.5 or greater.
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Recoveries: Nonpension assets that the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation assumes from a sponsor when its 
plan is terminated.
Reimbursements: Transfers of assets from the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s nonbudgetary trust fund 
to its on-budget revolving fund. These transfers, which 
are recorded as offsetting collections in the budget, are 
used to reimburse the agency for benefit payments and 
certain administrative costs related to terminations.
Revolving fund: A type of federal budget account that 
makes outlays for a specific purpose and is regularly re-
plenished by receipts intended for the same purpose. The 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) has 
seven revolving funds, although only three of them are 
actively used. Interest may accrue on assets held in a re-
volving fund. For reporting purposes, PBGC combines 
the activities of its revolving funds. 
Single-employer pension plan: A defined-benefit 
pension plan that is sponsored by a single firm.
Sponsor: An employer that establishes a pension plan 
and makes regular payments to it.
Standard termination: A termination in which a single-
employer plan is voluntarily terminated by the plan’s 
sponsor and its assets are adequate to cover its liabilities. 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation oversees stan-
dard terminations but does not become responsible for 
paying benefits. Participants can choose to take lump-
sum payments or have their benefits paid through a pri-
vate insurance company.
Trustee: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion’s status when it assumes legal and financial responsi-
bility for the assets and liabilities of a covered pension 
plan.
Variable-rate premium: A premium charged annu-
ally to single-employer pension plans covered by the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The 
variable-rate premium, charged only to plans that are 
considered underfunded under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, is currently $9 per $1,000 of under-
funding. Under certain circumstances, plans that are con-
sidered underfunded are exempt from paying the 
variable-rate premium. This premium is set by statute 
and cannot be altered by PBGC.
Vesting: The provision of retirement benefits that cannot 
be forfeited, occurring when a participant reaches a plan’s 
particular service requirements and otherwise qualifies. 
